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In a world’s first in 2010, the UK’s Ministry of Justice teamed up with Social Finance 
(a company providing financial advisory 
services) to launch a £5m social impact 
bond project. Under this scheme, 17 social 
investors—mainly charitable trusts and 
foundations—fund upfront the cost of social 
services for some 3,000 short-sentence 
Peterborough prisoners. 
The investors carry with them the 
expectation that these social services will 
lead to a decrease in the re-offending rate 
by at least 7.5%.1 If re-offending rates fall 
by that percentage or higher, the Ministry, 
supported by the Big Lottery Fund, will pay 
the investors between £5m and £8m.2 If the 
percentage is lower, the investors absorb 
the cost of the programmes. The scheme 
will run for six years.
The hope does not end there. If the project 
is successful,3 a second tranche of bonds 
worth £50m will be released by Social 
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A financial tool from Wall Street is being adapted in the social market to 
nurture early interventions and incentivise capital flow. As John Loder 
reports, social impact bonds promise two fundamental shifts—for 
governments to overcome the politics of fear and for private investors to 
fund social causes with impact. 
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Finance with the goal of closing four prisons within five years. 
The net savings to the government is projected at around 
£62m.   
The Evolution of Social Impact Bonds
Over the last few years, interest has grown in developing 
new investment approaches to social problems. Actually 
realising this interest has been difficult, but four developments 
accelerated thinking during the early 2000s: 
Greater interest on the part of investors and • 
philanthropists in combining commercial and social 
returns.4
Steady advances in assessing the impact of public • 
investments on social outcomes such as crime 
reduction or health improvements.5
Widespread experience of incorporating private • 
finance into public investment, such as the Private 
Finance Initiative in the UK, with a growing expertise 
on when these do and do not add value. 
A growing track record of significant impacts • 
achieved by innovative financing structures, for 
example, the development of markets for carbon 
reduction, prompted by the Kyoto Protocol and the 
European Union. 
Against this background, in early 2008, the Prime Minister’s 
Council on Social Action,6 led by banker and Young 
Foundation Chairman Peter Wheeler, began work to identify 
new types of investment vehicles for social outcomes. This 
work was based on two central insights:
 
First, socially valuable initiatives often also have • 
positive long term financial consequences. For 
example, working with ex-prisoners to help them 
commit fewer crimes can have huge savings in 
terms of future prison costs. The cost of a year’s 
imprisonment is more than the cost of a year’s tuition 
at one of Britain’s most exclusive private schools.
Secondly, despite this economic potential, the • 
institutions who can create these benefits cannot find 
the funding to do so.
This was a situation that cried out for a financial solution 
which eventually led to the development of the Social Impact 
Bond, or SIB. Essentially, an SIB is a financial instrument that 
raises capital and links financial returns to the achievement 
of a particular socially desirable outcome.
SIBs have the potential to bring in fresh sources of financial 
capital, to focus attention on preventive action, to promote 
innovation by transferring risk away from government, and 
to provide new funding for civil society organisations that 
face government funding cuts. Some of the work to realise 
this potential had been undertaken by Social Finance, which 
agreed on the terms of the first SIB in the final days of the 
Labour government in early 2010. 
The Young Foundation coined the term “Social Impact Bond,” 
and fed into Social Finance’s work while also developing 
alternative models of SIBs, all of which shared the goal of 
turning social outcomes into investments to encourage the 
creation of more good for less money.
What is a Social Impact Bond?
SIBs typically involve three elements:
Monetary investment (for example from commercial • 
investors, philanthropists or foundations); 
A programme of actions to improve the prospects • 
of a group (for example, a support and mentoring 
service for those leaving prison with the aim to reduce 
re-offending); and
Commitments by national or local government, or • 
foundations, to make payments to the investors that 
are linked to improved social outcomes achieved by 
the group (for example, re-payment of the original 
investment and an extra percentage agreed return 
on investment. Reduced costs to the Ministry of 
Justice are achieved through a reduction in the 
number of re-offenders in prison). Typically, payment 
is proportional to impact; if there is no impact, there 
is no repayment. 
“
SIBs have the potential 
to bring in fresh sources 
of financial capital, 
to focus attention on 
preventive action, to 
promote innovation by 
transferring risk away 
from government, 
and to provide new 
funding for civil society 
organisations that face 
government funding cuts.
Enlightened Marketplace
44     Social Space • 2011
Consequently, there are three roles in a typical SIB scheme—
the investor who supplies the capital, the operator who uses 
this money to run a socially useful programme, and the 
payer, usually government, who pays out if outcomes have 
been met. 
The investor is likely to be, initially, at least, a philanthropic 
foundation and government branch. In time, it is hoped the 
SIBs will develop into a mature asset class that can attract 
a broader commercial investment. However, this is likely to 
be some years away. For now, the operator tends to be a 
non-profit, a governmental body such as a local authority, or 
a consortium containing both types. 
SIBs are most likely to be of use in areas where a single 
outcome can provide both social and economic value. 
Criminal justice provides one such area, where a fall in the 
reoffending rate is both economically and socially desirable. 
Providing the support necessary to allow elderly people to live 
independent and active lives, rather than fall into residential 
care, is another area of high potential. Indeed, an SIB was 
announced in Australia in March 2011 to focus on these two 
areas, along with high risk families. “
SIBs are most likely to be of 
use in areas where a single 
outcome can provide both 
social and economic value. 
Criminal justice provides 
one such area, where a fall in 
the reoffending rate is both 
economically and socially 
desirable.
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Social Impact Bonds Outcomes-based 
contracts
Government debt
Public sector only pays for 
success
Risk that interventions do not 
improve outcomes is transferred 
away from the public sector
Additional non-government 
finance is provided to improve 
social outcomes
Public sector payments 
are proportional to the 
improvement in social outcomes 
Environmental integrity
Service providers’ costs are 
funded up front
Facilitates cooperation between 
multiple service providers
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A Comparison with Other Government 
Finance Tools
If a comparison needs to be made, the preceding chart 
from Social Finance’s 2010 report “Towards a New Social 
Economy” sums up the key defining characteristics of 
SIBs when compared with outcomes-based contracts 
and government debt. Unlike the latter two finance tools, 
an SIB enables payments to be made based on the degree 
of impact while facilitating cooperation between multiple 
service providers.
Differentiators of an SIB
It should be noted that SIBs are about more than just extra 
capital. After all, the state could invest in the same solutions 
that are being funded here, at lower capital costs, and with 
minimal transaction costs. Therefore, to justify themselves, 
SIBs need to show that they can channel this capital more 
efficiently and with better outcomes than ordinary state 
expenditure could. There are several reasons why they 
should be expected to do this. 
First, SIBs provide better incentives. Until recently, incentives 
for social interventions have often been based not on 
outcomes, but on activity. A social organisation might be 
paid for its time working with unemployed teenagers, rather 
than on whether that results in the teenagers finding work. 
SIBs incentivise based on outcomes, and will lead to a 
sharper focus on what works. 
Secondly, SIBs can match incentive and capability. This is 
often a problem for large state institutions. Those parts of 
the institution that have the capability to affect an outcome 
may not have the incentive to act. Examples from inside 
government include: 
Local authorities or NGOs responsible for providing • 
services to young people do not share the benefits 
from reductions in prison numbers or benefits bills.
 
There are few incentives for agencies to invest • 
heavily and support the development of new 
preventive measures or programmes, despite 
strong evidence about the long-term social gains. 
Health promotion or prevention of unhealthy • 
behaviour often involves action by agencies such 
as schools, the long term benefits of which accrue 
to the health sector. But these are not success 
indicators with which schools are rewarded. 
“SIBs potentially provide a systematic, evidence-based way of scaling up schemes that work well, while promoting a culture of innovation. There are strong grounds for believing that there is systematic under-investment in effective prevention of social problems.7 
SIBs fill the gap by functioning as a link between one part 
of government and another, for example between local and 
central government, or between a national health system and 
the schools system. It provides a framework or a mechanism 
for otherwise disparate actors to look at the issues as part 
of a wider system. 
For SIBs that bring in non-state institutions such as operators 
and funders, there are additional benefits. 
For starters, SIBs provide space for risk-taking innovation. 
Large institutions typically find it hard to encourage 
appropriate innovative risk-taking internally. Innovation is 
often no one’s remit, and it’s disruptive to existing practice 
and interests. As Keynes said, “Worldly wisdom teaches that 
it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed 
unconventionally.” Political considerations magnify this issue 
in government; failures may be excoriated in the press, while 
successes often go unsung. By its nature, innovation is risky 
and the cost of failure may be, politically, too high a price for 
those within existing institutions.  
SIBs allow someone other than government in its 
commissioning role to bear the risk of social programmes. If 
outcomes are not improved, government does not pay out. 
Instead, the risk sits with those with an appetite for it, and the 
means to make that project a success. 
Of course, such an approach requires a careful and accurate 
measurement of the relevant outcomes. This builds a body 
of understanding about the most effective methods for 
dealing with social problems that often arise in fields where 
high quality evidence is hard to find. 
Finally, an innovative system requires a pathway whereby 
successful ideas demonstrate their effectiveness, and are 
applied on a wider scale. Innovative solutions have little 
value if they are not implemented, and the incentive to 
develop them is diminished when implementation is difficult. 
In the social sector, funding to scale up is usually scarce. 
Many innovative institutions, funded by donors, operate at 
a small scale. Further, charitable donations are not likely to 
be sufficient for even a regional roll out of an idea; instead, 
government funding is necessary.
 
Yet, getting the attention and resources of government is 
uncertain. Institutions with a charismatic representative, 
strong marketing, an appealing client base and good 
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timing may find themselves part of a prominent government 
initiative that is rolled out very quickly. In some cases, this 
roll‐out outpaces institutional capability, and the promising 
effects of the pilot are not repeated on a wider scale. Other 
equally effective institutions may find even maintaining 
funding, a continuous struggle and a wider roll‐out, a distant 
aspiration.
  
SIBs potentially provide a systematic, evidence-based way of 
scaling up schemes that work well, while promoting a culture 
of innovation. They allow government to take full advantage 
of the grass roots innovation that is going on by trying out 
a number of different solutions with managed risk. Further, 
funders are incentivised to moderate the speed of roll-out, so 
that it does not outpace the capacity of the organisation.
Challenges in Implementation
Despite the significant potential benefits of SIBs, there are 
also challenges that need to be worked through. The most 
technically complex issue is how to measure the impact 
fairly. Funders and government must be confident that the 
metric used in an SIB is a reliable and unbiased yardstick of 
performance. This issue can be thought of in two parts. 
The first task is to establish that the outcome has changed as 
a result of the intervention, rather than for some independent 
reason. An SIB based on reducing reoffending must be able to 
show that fewer crimes are committed due to the mentoring 
of prisoners, rather than an improvement in the economy, or 
a change in the legal environment. This issue is not unique 
to SIBs, but is common to most studies in social science, 
and there is a well established methodology associated with 
it and for dealing with appropriate control groups, selection 
bias, statistical confidence levels and so on. 
The second task is to show that changes in the outcome 
produce savings. This is a less well developed area, and is 
worth commenting on briefly. 
First, a minimum scale of impact may be necessary to 
release savings. For example, to save on prison costs, a 
prison wing may have to close before government achieves 
any actual savings. To manage this risk, SIB partners should 
ensure the process of making savings is clearly agreed 
on at the beginning of the SIB. There also needs to be a 
mechanism whereby the scale of the SIB can be tweaked if 
the impact proves to be insufficient to achieve actual savings 
for government. 
Secondly, diffuse benefits can also be an issue. It may be 
difficult to collaborate across local and central government to 
address where the multiple benefits should fall. For example, 
less reoffending has a large direct savings for a country’s 
ministry of justice, and it is thus relatively easy to allocate 
the savings. 
On the other hand an initiative working with the most 
deprived and chaotic families might bring benefits across 
justice, health, education and housing. It might also increase 
costs to some parts of government, as these families access 
services that they have previously not used, such as primary 
healthcare and training. Allocation of these cost and benefits 
can be excessively complex. SIBs will work best where a 
costs and benefits can be clearly allocated to one or two 
institutions.
Thirdly, there is a need to consider the effects of the 
intervention on the wider system. In our criminal justice 
example, a successful programme will result in fewer crimes 
being committed by our target group, and fewer prison 
places being occupied. It will also free up the police time that 
“
“
Despite the significant potential benefits of SIBs, there are also 
challenges that need to be worked through. The most technically 
complex issue is how to measure the impact fairly.
SIBs are now being 
considered in many parts 
of the world as a viable 
social tool, including the 
US, Australia and Europe. 
Their apparent simplicity 
is clearly appealing, even 
if their execution is likely 
to be more complex. 
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hospitals or housing, but for social interventions. They will 
require low transaction costs to work.
Finally, there is a need for intermediaries who can negotiate 
and manage SIBs. In their most extensive form, SIBs will 
involve the management of complex negotiations across 
three different realms—the public, private, and the social. 
As these all have their own specialist language and culture, 
the scope for misunderstandings and loss of momentum 
is considerable. Strong relationship management skills are 
vital, so that the perspectives and concerns of the different 
realms—from policy maker to social entrepreneur, from 
financier to public service commissioner—can be taken on 
board and made intelligible to all the parties involved in creating 
an SIB. Such a blend of requirements is not straightforward 
to deploy. However, a number of organisations across the 
world is developing this range of skills, either together, or in 
alliances, and we expect the supporting industry to develop 
steadily. 
Conclusion
SIBs are now being considered in many parts of the world as 
a viable social tool, including the US, Australia and Europe. 
Their apparent simplicity is clearly appealing, even if their 
execution is likely to be more complex. 
They have considerable potential to improve social 
outcomes by aligning incentives, providing space for risk and 
innovation, and promoting evidence-based policies. Much of 
the detail remains to be worked out. Our hope is that a range 
of variants will be tried, tested and evaluated over the next 
few years with maximum openness on methods, legal forms 
and results. Some of these experiments will fail, but others 
will succeed. Given the high levels of activity and interest in 
SIBs internationally, we expect them to evolve quickly, with 
variants becoming a mainstream financing instrument.
would have been spent pursuing these groups. However, the 
police may use the additional time to arrest a different set of 
criminals who will, in turn, fill prison places. Thus, not all the 
potential savings will be realised. Returns from SIBs need to 
be high enough to absorb some allowance for this knock-on 
effect. 
Fourthly, a key challenge for SIBs is to ensure they do not 
displace existing spending and interventions by incentivising 
existing funders or providers to cut spending or provision. 
This is particularly challenging where considerable overlaps 
exist with existing public provision. In trying to better align 
incentives, SIBs risk creating new misalignments. To 
manage this risk, SIB partners can include existing providers 
in the SIB as partners, ensuring that they have a strong 
incentive to make the SIB work, and/or reach agreement 
with existing providers to maintain current levels of spending 
or programme delivery.
Structural Deficiencies to be Rectified
For the considerable potential of SIBs to be realised, a 
number of developments are necessary. 
First, much of the detail of the structure remains to be 
worked out. Necessary returns, measurement rules, 
payment timings, and legal structures are all uncertain at this 
point. The answers to these questions will only come from 
experience. 
Secondly, this experience needs to be translated into standard 
contracts and structures, in order to minimise transaction 
costs. High transaction costs were one of the issues that 
bedevilled private finance initiative funding in the UK, meaning 
that contracts needed to be very large to be economic. SIBs 
are not designed for expensive operations such as building 
1. This percentage fall is compared to a control group of short-sentence prisoners in the UK. 
2. Investors receive an increasing return capped at a maximum of 13% per year over an eight year period. 
3. At the time of writing, it’s still too early to get any sense of how it’s progressing.
4. Geoff Mulgan, “Measuring Social Value,” Stanford Social Innovation Review (August, 2010) provides an overview of the many 
methods for assessing value, as well as suggesting how these can be made more useful, http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/
measuring_social_value/. 
5. For example, see the recently launched journal Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice (The Policy Press).  
6. A group of innovators from every sector brought together to generate ideas and initiatives through which Government and other 
key stakeholders can catalyse, celebrate and develop social action.
7. “Early Intervention Key to Crime Prevention, MPs Say,” www.parliament.uk, 23 March 2010, http://www.parliament.uk/business/
news/2010/03/early-intervention-key-to-crime-prevention-mps-say/. 
Enlightened Marketplace
